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Several years ago the National Bureau of Economic Research began a major 
project on the economics of national security. We  wanted to look beyond the 
traditional issues of  defense budgeting and military procurement to focus on 
the broad economic forces that could affect the security of the United States in 
future decades. One aspect of this research has been a major study of economic 
transformation in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, since economic devel- 
opments there are likely to be important for the political and military stability 
of that region and therefore of Europe and the Middle East.’ The second major 
area of our research on national security has focused on the relationship be- 
tween the United States and Japan. 
The present conference was designed to explore the frequently raised ques- 
tion, “Are United States-Japan relations in the Pacific Asian region a potential 
national security risk  for the United States?’  In a departure from our usual 
approach, the research team for this project was expanded to include political 
scientists as well as economists, and the project was co-managed by economist 
Jeffrey Frankel and political scientist Miles Kahler. 
Three types of questions were posed to the economic researchers in the proj- 
ect. Is the Pacific Asian area becoming an economic “bloc” with an unusual 
concentration of trade, finance, and investment? Does Japan dominate the eco- 
nomic relations of the region, including trade flows, finance, and investment? 
Are the Pacific Asian countries becoming dependent on Japan for trade, fi- 
nance, investment, and foreign aid? 
We  asked the political scientists three much more difficult questions. If  an 
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economic bloc centered on Japan is forming in the region or will develop in 
the future, what effect will that have on the political alliances of the region’s 
countries with the United States and with Japan? Similarly, what effect will it 
have on potential security relations in the area? And, more generally, can these 
developments pose a military or more general national security risk for the 
United States? 
Although the political scientists were not able to answer the questions as we 
had posed them, they did teach us a number of quite different but very im- 
portant things about how to think about the relation between national security 
and economics. The political scientists emphasized that there is more to a 
“bloc” than nonsymmetric patterns of trade, finance, and investment, and that 
it is therefore necessary to look in a more disaggregated way at specific indus- 
tries and economic relations in order to understand the changing patterns of 
power and influence that follow changing economic relations. They reminded 
the economists that observed patterns of economic activity do not reflect just 
natural comparative advantage and geographic distance but depend on govern- 
ment policies and that policies in turn reflect interests within countries. And 
they noted that Japanese foreign policy and foreign economic policy are evolv- 
ing and this evolution can be understood only by recognizing the existence of 
heterogeneous forces within the Japanese bureaucracy and the Liberal Demo- 
cratic party. I found these comments very useful in themselves and important 
as a guide to future research. 
My task now is to summarize what I have learned about the original subject: 
the national security risk to the United States implied by the evolving United 
States-Japan  relations in the Pacific Asian region. It will be helpful if I do this 
in terms of five questions. 
1. Is the Pac$c  Asian region becoming an economic bloc centered on Japan? 
Jeffrey Frankel’s statistical analysis has shown that there is nothing about the 
overall trade pattern to suggest that this area is becoming a trading bloc, any 
more than geography alone would suggest, or that Japan is playing a particu- 
larly central role in trade within the region. Future studies at a more disaggre- 
gated level will be necessary, however, to determine whether this is also true 
in key industries and products. 
In contrast to trade, there is no doubt that Japan has become the dominant 
source of foreign direct investment in the region, far outstripping the level of 
investment from the United States and Europe. The political scientists have 
persuasively urged that the next step should be an analysis of patterns of own- 
ership and control that determine the extent of influence and dependence. A 
similar predominance of Japan has also developed in the flow of development 
assistance in the region. 
The pattern of financial flows is more unclear, but the trends suggest a grow- 
ing role for Japan and the yen in the financial relations of the region. Whether 
the recent weakness of the Japanese banks will change this remains to be seen. 451  National Security Aspects of  United States-Japan Economic Relations 
2. Is Japan acting in ways that could lead to a hegemonic position in the Pacijc 
Asian region? There is a range of voices in Japan calling for a more inward- 
looking policy for Pacific Asia with a dominant role for Japan. In the extreme, 
this is summarized with the slogan, “Asia for the Asians.” The advocates of 
such a policy point to similarities of East Asian culture in the broadest sense 
(e.g., the Asian emphasis on consensual politics), of religion (i.e., the impor- 
tance of Confucianism and Buddhism and the minor role placed by Christian- 
ity), and of race. 
At  a more practical level, businessmen and government officials in Japan 
point to the development of  EC92 in  Europe and the North American Free 
Trade Agreement and argue that Japan (or Asia) needs to protect itself with a 
similar Asian economic bloc. Some Japanese are talking about the desirability 
of developing an East Asia coprosperity sphere, despite the very negative his- 
toric connotations of that term. 
Some of  the actions of  the Japanese government and of  private Japanese 
businesses are consistent with trying to establish a hegemonic position in the 
region. The most obvious of these is the dominant role of Japanese direct in- 
vestment in countries like Thailand and Indonesia, where Japan’s activity far 
outstrips that of the United States and Europe. 
There is also no doubt that Japanese official development assistance is gen- 
erally targeted for Asian countries, with much of it going to rapidly growing 
countries rather than to those countries with the greatest poverty. Although 
there is evidence that most of  the aid is not  literally tied with “buy Japan” 
requirements, critics complain that the aid is given in a form that is advanta- 
geous to Japanese business interests (like the financing of transportation and 
other infrastructure  that would be useful for international trade). 
Such criticism seems excessive. Even if Japanese development assistance is 
helpful to Japanese business, that is not inconsistent with its helping the recipi- 
ents as well and even with its benefiting businesses in the United States and 
other trading partners as much as it helps Japanese businesses. Moreover, Japan 
is not unusual in restricting its aid in various ways. 
A third way in which Japan may be strengthening  its role in the region is by 
dealing more actively than the United States with China and Vietnam. But here 
the explanation is that U.S. domestic politics impedes American activity rather 
than that Japanese policies in the area have been particularly aggressive. 
In short, there is some behavior that may increase Japan’s relative strength 
in the region, but it would be difficult to interpret this as evidence that Japan 
is seeking to establish itself as a hegemonic power in East Asia. 
3. Does Japan want to establish a hegemonic position in the future? Although 
current behavior cannot be interpreted as an active pursuit of hegemonic status, 
it is interesting to ask whether the Japanese want to establish such a position 
and will take steps to do so in the future. 
There is not doubt that there are potential economic rewards of being the 452  Martin Feldstein 
local hegemon. By excluding others from the market or restricting their access, 
a Japanese hegemon could enjoy the benefits of being a monopoly supplier or 
a monopsony purchaser. More subtle advantages could accrue to firms that use 
exclusive access to develop more advantageous integrated production arrange- 
ments. 
Another reason Japan might want to develop a hegemonic status in the re- 
gion is to promulgate its development strategy. Many Japanese officials and 
academics have recently contrasted the Japanese approach to economic devel- 
opment with the approach advocated by  the United States, the World Bank, 
and other “Western” authorities. The Japanese emphasize a greater role for 
government at the early stage of development, a different approach to domestic 
competition, different intercorporate financial arrangements, and so forth. The 
desire to promote the Japanese approach to development may reflect honest 
differences of development philosophy. It may also (or alternatively) reflect a 
desire to have  neighboring countries pursue development strategies that are 
more compatible with current Japanese industrial policy and with the mode of 
operation of Japanese private industry. 
Finally, the Japanese may want to establish a hegemonic role in the region 
as a matter of national pride. At a time when the major industrial countries are 
calling on Japan to exercise more “leadership” in  world affairs, it is easy to 
confuse hegemony with leadership. 
But even if there are many in Japan who would like to see a Japanese hegem- 
ony in the Pacific Asian region, I believe it is unlikely to occur. The desire to 
play such a role and the benefits of establishing a hegemonic position are sim- 
ply not great enough to outweigh the costs of doing so. 
The greatest such cost would  be the conflict that  would  result with the 
United States. The United States is not only the largest market for Japan’s ex- 
ports but also Japan’s strongest ally in global affairs. A new generation of polit- 
ical leaders in Japan could be willing to pay this cost, but there is no indication 
of such an inclination at the present time. 
A second cost of achieving hegemony would be the resistance from the indi- 
vidual countries of East Asia. The history of Japan as an aggressive power in 
the region, not only in World War  I1 but ever since the opening of Japan in 
the mid-nineteenth century, makes these countries nervous about seeing Japan 
increase its power in the region. These countries will therefore seek to keep the 
United States and other nations involved in order to prevent the development of 
Japanese monopoly and monopsony power. 
4. Will the collapse of the Soviet Union change United States-Japan  relations 
in ways that affect U.S. national security? In many ways this is the most specu- 
lative of the five questions, particularly because of the recentness of develop- 
ments in the former Soviet Union. Moreover, although there is much talk about 
the end of  the Cold War and the elimination of the Soviet threat, substantial 
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sands of  nuclear warheads  on  missiles  that  are potentially targeted at the 
United States and Japan. Moreover, the Japanese are acutely aware that they 
still have no treaty with Russia and that Russian soldiers still occupy the four 
northern islands that belonged to Japan before World War I1 and that Japan 
regards as Japanese temtory. 
But, to the extent that Russia (and the other parts of the former Soviet Union) 
is no longer a security threat to Japan and the United States, the United States- 
Japan bilateral relation is weakened in five distinct ways. 
First, the elimination of the Soviet Union as a military threat to Japan means 
that Japan no longer needs the protection of  the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The 
reduced dependence of Japan on the United States gives Japan greater freedom 
to develop its own policies, including polices that create conflicts with the 
United States. 
Second, from the American point of view, there is no longer as great a need 
to use Japan as a base for American military presence in the Pacific area. Mili- 
tary considerations are therefore no longer as much of  a check on potential 
trade conflict or other conflicts between the United States and Japan. 
Third, the collapse of communism highlights the varieties of capitalism. As 
long as the world was divided into capitalist and communist camps, the United 
States and Japan were clearly members of  the same club. Now  the contrast 
between U.S. capitalism of  independent shareholder-owned firms and Japa- 
nese keiretsu capitalism appears more sharply. This is a source of conflict not 
only in United States-Japan trade relations but also in the shaping of develop- 
ment assistance. 
Fourth, the absence of  a Soviet military threat makes it easier for Japan to 
normalize relations with China. Many in Japan look to China as the source 
of markets and indirectly of manpower for Japan in the twenty-first century. 
Although Japan’s pursuit of close relations with China requires overcoming the 
memories of Japan’s role there before and during World War 11,  the Japanese 
are making major efforts in this direction. These developments could reverse 
the relative importance of the United States and Japan in China. Given China’s 
geographic size and its overwhelming population, any potential shift in China’s 
link from the United States to Japan could have substantial long-term security 
ramifications for the United States. 
Finally, the decline of Soviet power in the Middle East provides an opportu- 
nity for Japan to develop a Middle East policy that serves its own interests 
without worrying about the implications for the U.S.-Soviet  conflict. Japan 
clearly has strong interests in the region because of its dependence on oil im- 
ports from the area. There is no reason to expect that Japan’s interests in this 
complex part of the world coincide with the interests of the United Sates. A 
current example of  this may  be  Japan’s  active cultivation of  ties with  Iran 
through official as well as business channels. 
In each of these five ways, the collapse of the Soviet Union has changed the 
likely future relations between the United States and Japan. Each is now mili- 454  Martin Feldstein 
tarily less dependent on the other and therefore more likely to pursue policies 
that have adverse effects on the other country. 
5. Is the United States vulnerable to a shift in United States-Japan  relations? 
Despite the trade conflict, the United States and Japan have been strong allies 
that share a common philosophy. It is possible, however, that a combination 
of  developments-shifting  economics relations in East Asia, pressure inside 
Japan for that country to play a hegemonic role in the area, and the end of the 
Soviet military  threat-could  cause a significant change in the relations be- 
tween the Untied States and Japan. Even if that is unlikely, it is worth asking 
whether such a shift could create a serious national security risk for the United 
Sates. Put succinctly, is the United States potentially vulnerable to a shift of 
Japanese policy toward the United States? 
There is no doubt about the converse; Japan is vulnerable to a shift in U.S. 
policy toward Japan. Japan must import its food and energy. The large amount 
of foreign direct investment that Japan has in the United States is a hostage 
that is not matched by comparable US. investment in Japan. An antagonistic 
U.S. government could change tax rules in a way that drastically reduces the 
economic value of those investments to their Japanese owners. The hundreds 
of billions of dollars of portfolio investments that Japanese companies have in 
U.S.  securities are a further hostage that could be effectively  destroyed by a 
change in U.S. tax policy. Closing the U.S. market to the nearly $100 billion a 
year that the U.S. imports from Japan would do substantial damage to Japa- 
nese industry. 
The Japanese are very much aware of this vulnerability to the United States. 
Their awareness of this vulnerability is likely to be a positive force that keeps 
our bilateral relationship from degenerating. 
The United States does not share the same types of vulnerability vis-a-vis 
Japan. Our investments in Japan are very much less than Japanese investments 
in the United States. Our exports to Japan are also very much less, and agricul- 
tural products are a large part of those exports; a decision by Japan to reduce 
agricultural imports from the United States in favor of other producers would 
not change the global demand for US. agricultural products. 
Many Americans  worry  about the “financial  vulnerability” of the United 
States to Japan. They are concerned that the Japanese government might cause 
Japanese financial  investors  to stop the annual flow of funds to the United 
States or, in the extreme, might cause those investors to sell their bonds and 
other financial investments  in the United States “and bring that capital back 
to Japan.” 
Neither of these should be a real source of concern. Because of the sharply 
reduced U.S. trade deficit, the United States no longer needs a substantial in- 
flow of capital each year; the current account deficit for 1992 was only 1 per- 
cent of our GDP. In any case, if  Japanese institutions  stopped buying  U.S. 
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countries, the funds that they displaced would flow to the United States. The 
most harm that would result from an unwillingness of the Japanese to make 
financial investments in the United States might be a very small increase in the 
interest rate on U.S. bonds. 
The idea that Japan could “sell their bonds and bring the funds home” is 
based on a misconception. Even if Japanese investors wanted to sell all of their 
U.S. bonds (thereby precipitating a capital loss for themselves), they could not 
“bring the funds home” unless Japan shifted from having a large trade surplus 
to a large trade deficit; that is, a capital flow into Japan is only possible if Japan 
has a large trade deficit. A decision by Japanese investors to sell dollar bonds 
and shift the funds to other countries would put downward pressure on the U.S. 
dollar (relative to the yen and to the currencies in which the Japanese invested) 
and upward pressure on our interest rates relative to other interest rates in the 
world financial markets. The combination of  a depressed dollar and higher 
U.S. interest rates would induce the funds displaced elsewhere by the shift of 
Japanese investments to flow to the United States. When the dust settled, there 
would be little change in the value of  either the dollar or the level of  U.S. 
interest rates. To the extent that the dollar remained lower than it had been 
before, the effect would be to stimulate U.S. exports (and to reduce our im- 
But although the United States is not financially vulnerable to Japan, techno- 
logical vulnerability may  be a real problem with potential consequences for 
U.S. military security. The United States now depends on Japan for semicon- 
ductors, machine tools, and many of the components of aircraft and military 
equipment. How vulnerable does this makes us? If  Japan decided to ban the 
sale of such items to the United States, how long would it be before American 
firms could make these things? Is the number of such products increasing? Is 
the time that it would take the United States the substitute for such products 
becoming greater? I cannot answer these questions, but I believe that it is im- 
portant to have answers and to keep those answers up to date. 
Although the possibility of such a rupture of United States-Japan relations 
may  seem remote, it may not be, particularly if there is a change of political 
power in Japan. Except for a very short period, the government of Japan has 
been controlled by the Liberal Democratic party. The opposition Socialist party 
has very different views from the LDP about military activities in general and 
about United States-Japan  military relations in particular. It is certainly not 
inconceivable that the LDP could at some time during the next few years lose 
control of the Diet and have to form a coalition with the Socialist party or allow 
the Socialist party to form the government. Japan already has a policy that bans 
exports of weapons. This is currently interpreted in a way that allows Japan to 
sell critical components of military equipment to the United States. We should 
not assume that this interpretation would always be sustained, especially if the 
Socialist party were to come to power or even to be a part of the government 
coalition. A ban on military exports to the United States could even occur 
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during a period of  attempted U.S. military activity like the recent Gulf War, 
because of a general antiwar sentiment in Japan or because of a sense that the 
current specific U.S. policy is contrary to Japan’s interests. 
The United States needs to recognize this risk and consider what actions 
should be taken now to deal with this technological vulnerability. There are, I 
believe, four possibilities. 
First, the United States could simply accept the new military vulnerability 
to Japan, recognizing that Japan is at least as vulnerable to the United States. 
While it would therefore be irrational for Japan to exercise its strength, the risk 
would remain. The existence of that risk would limit our ability to contemplate 
independent military actions of the sort that we did in Iraq and, more generally, 
would limit our ability to assure our own self-protection and our ability to use 
force to maintain global stability. 
Second, the United States could seek to eliminate the technological vulnera- 
bility by producing the needed military components instead of importing them 
from Japan. Because we would not have the economies of scale associated with 
production for civilian as well as military use, this form of procurement could 
be much more expensive than importing. The costs look even more formidable 
if we consider the need to do the product design research and to develop the 
manufacturing equipment that would be needed to make the military equip- 
ment. For example, how much of a “nonmarket” machine tool industry would 
we need to support in order to have the capability to manufacture products that 
we now import, and how expensive would it be to maintain such an industry? 
Third, the United States could use trade barriers to protect those industries 
that make products that are important for military purposes. This includes not 
only the final military components but also such industries as semiconductors, 
computers, numerically controlled machine tools, critical materials, and so 
forth. The United States already does this to a limited extent, most recently by 
protecting the U.S. machine tool industry on the basis of  its military impor- 
tance. In principle, the products that would be protected would be chosen on 
the basis of  their military importance only and not as a matter of  domestic 
industrial policy. In practice, however, it would be difficult to decide where 
lines should be drawn, especially since protecting products like machine tools 
would artificially raise the cost of making various consumer products. Should 
the producers of those nonmilitary products be penalized by the military deci- 
sion to protect machine tools or should they be “compensated” by the protec- 
tion of their products? 
Finally, the United States could seek to achieve greater access to Japanese 
technology of military significance through joint production or other arrange- 
ments that eliminate U.S. vulnerability. Taken by itself, there is no reason for 
Japanese firms to voluntarily allow US. firms to share their technology and to 
produce many of the relevant products under license in the United States. The 
government of Japan might, however, have a different view about this if they 
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technological vulnerability might be broad protectionist legislation of the type 
described in the previous paragraph. The Japanese government would also rec- 
ognize that, even if such protectionist legislation was not passed and the United 
States accepted a relation of  mutual vulnerability, that could lead under the 
type of  scenario described above to a very costly rupture of  United States- 
Japan relations if some future Japanese government blocked the exports of Jap- 
anese products of  military significance. In  comparison to these alternatives, 
cooperative sharing of  technology might seem attractive. This Page Intentionally Left Blank